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The venture capital market and firms whose creation and early stages were
financed by venture capital are among the crown jewels of the American economy.
Beyond representing an important engine of macroeconomic growth and job creation,
these firms have been a major force in commercializing cutting edge science, whether
through their impact on existing industries as with the radical changes in pharmaceuticals
catalyzed by venture-backed firms commercialization of biotechnology, or by the their
role in developing entirely new industries as with the emergence of the internet and world
wide web. The venture capital market thus provides a unique link between finance and
innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms -- organizational forms particularly
well suited to innovation -- with capital market access that is tailored to the special task
of financing these high risk, high return activities.1
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It is hardly surprising, then, that other countries have sought to emulate American
success in developing an effective venture capital market.2 At a time when developing
countries are increasingly losing manufacturing jobs to low wage countries, and when
low wage countries seek industries that depend on more than just cheap labor, creating a
venture capital market has become the holy grail of economic development.3
In this article, I seek to identify the core of the U.S. venture capital contracting
model, and then assess the extent to which this model provides guidance in fashioning a
venture capital market in other countries. This effort proceeds by a number of steps.
The analysis builds on what should be a non-controversial premise – that the
manner in which the U.S. venture capital market developed is not duplicable elsewhere.
The U.S. venture capital market has a wildly idiosyncratic history that ranges from postGold Rush California, when Stephen Field, David Dudley Field’s more successful
younger brother, facilitated the adoption in California of his brother’s failed New York
Civil Code, and thereby planted the seeds for Silicon Valley through the Code’s
inexplicable prohibition of covenants not to compete, to the World War II Boston area
research labs, to Frederick Terman’s successful effort to sow the seeds of Silicon Valley
by linking Stanford University and the emerging electronics industry through the creation
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“[T]here now exists a wide consensus among economists, business leaders and policy-makers that a
vibrant venture capital industry is the cornerstone of America’s leadership in the commercialization of
technological innovation. A related and widely held belief is that the lack of venture capital hinders Europe
from competing on equal footing.” Laura Bottazzi & Marco Da Rin, Venture Capital in Europe and the
Financing of Innovative Companies, 17 Economic Policy 231, 231 (2002).
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(http://europa.eu.int/comm/internalmarket/en) At the Nice European Council of December 2000, the
European Union’s fifteen heads of state characterized entrepreneurship as central to employment policy.
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of the Stanford Industrial Park, to post-World War II political decisions concerning how
to finance retirement security.4
But while the path along which the U.S. venture capital market developed was
surely idiosyncratic, the outcome of the development was not. The argument’s most
important step is to recognize that the keystone of the U.S. venture capital market is
private ordering – the contracting structure that developed to manage the extreme
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs that inevitably bedevil early stage,
high technology financing. Start-up and early stage companies are peculiarly suited to
commercializing innovation, yet the character of their organization and the nature of the
activity present inherent barriers to their finance. The U.S. venture capital contracting
model manages these barriers and thereby makes early stage financing feasible. The
question, then, is whether the U.S. contracting template can be replicated elsewhere: can
we engineer a venture capital market?
The second step in the analysis takes up the engineering problem. Here the
difficulty is that replicating the U.S. venture capital contracting structure confronts a
daunting simultaneity problem. Three central inputs are necessary to the engineering
process: capital, specialized financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs.5 The problem is
that each of these inputs will emerge if the other two are present, but none will emerge in
isolation of the others.
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Ronald Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route
128, and Covenants not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 575, 588-89; 613-20 (1999).
5
Any capital market also requires a range of foundational attributes, like property rights, honest and
effective courts, and the like. Detailing the general social and institutional infrastructure necessary to
support a capital market of any sort is beyond my ambitions here. For an interesting assay of these issues
with respect to the necessary preconditions for a stock market, see Bernard Black, the Legal and
Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L.Rev. 781 (2001). See also Andrzej
Rapaczynski, The Role of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. Econ. Perspec. 87
(1996).
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This brings us to the third step: who will be the engineer? The U.S. venture
capital market developed organically, largely without government assistance and
certainly without government design. Countries now seeking to develop a venture capital
market must necessarily follow a different path than did the U.S., and understandably
look to government to provide direction when market forces are unlikely to solve the
simultaneity problem. As a result, government programs are commonplace in countries
seeking to develop a venture capital market. Most such programs, however, have been
unsuccessful.6 The reason, I will suggest, is that most government programs have tried to
deal with the simultaneity problem by having the government both provide capital and
itself act as the financial intermediary. Programs structured in this fashion fail because
the government cannot respond to the trio of contracting problems inherent in early stage,
high technology financing. Rather, a specialized financial intermediary is necessary for
which the government is not a substitute. The point is illustrated by discussion of three
different government programs – one remarkably unsuccessful early effort in Germany;
one more recent, more successful program in Israel; and a newly launched program in
Chile.
The final step in the analysis describes an approach by which the government can
help engineer a venture capital market. The approach recognizes that the key to the
engineering task is solving the simultaneity problem without substituting the government,
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Despite a large number of European government efforts, the European venture capital market remains a
fraction of the size of the United States market. Controlling for the size of the economy, in 1995, U.S.
venture capital financing was eight times the comparable European figure. Paul Gompers & Joshua Lerner,
The Venture Capital Cycle 326 n.1 (2000). In 2001, the difference was said to be five times, but that figure
may be understated because of differences in definition of venture capital in the U.S. and Europe. Bottazzi
& Da Rin, supra note 2, at 232.
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which cannot solve the contracting problems of venture capital financing, for critical
market participants.
I. An Overview of the Organizational and Contractual Structure of U.S. Venture
Capital
The typical transactional pattern in the U.S. venture capital market is for institutional
investors – pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and endowments and foundations to
invest through intermediaries – venture capital limited partnerships, usually called “venture
capital funds,” in which the investors are passive limited partners. Venture capital funds are
typically blind pools. At the time an institution decides whether to participate in a venture
capital fund, it receives an offering memorandum that discloses the fund’s investment strategy
– for example, that the fund will specialize in a particular industry, like the internet, or a
distinct development stage, like early stage investments. However, the particular companies
in which the fund will invest are not yet known. Consistent with the legal rules governing
limited partnerships, the limited partners may not participate in the day-to-day management of
the fund’s business, including especially the approval of particular portfolio company
investments.7 In this respect, the venture capital fund’s governance structure formalizes the
standard Berle-Means problem of the separation of ownership and control.8 The general
partner (GP) puts up only one percent of the capital, but receives essentially complete control
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Under Delaware law, the limited partners can make certain extraordinary decisions, such as replacing the
general partner or terminating the partnership. See 6 Del.C. §17-303(b)(8)(e). However, these rights are
typically restricted by contract. See Michael C. Halloran, Gregg Vignos & C. Brian Wainwright,
Agreement of Limited Partnership, in I Venture Capital and Public Offering Negotiation 1-1 through 1-218
(M. Halloran, R. Gunderson, Jr., & J. del Cavo, eds. 1998) (form of limited partnership agreement with
commentary). Venture capital funds frequently do appoint advisory committees, usually made up of
investor representatives, that monitor the fund’s performance. See William A. Sahlman, The Structure and
Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J.Fin. Econ. 473, 493 (1990).
8
Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932).
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over all of it.9 The particular terms of the fund’s governance are set out in the limited
partnership agreement.10
The GP actually makes and monitors the venture capital fund’s investments. The GP
is typically itself a company comprised of investment professionals, which expects to continue
in the venture capital market by raising successive funds after the capital in a particular fund
has been invested in portfolio companies. This expectation, and the GP’s investment in a
business infrastructure, provides a powerful performance incentive. Commonly, the GP will
begin seeking investors for a successor fund by the midpoint of the existing fund’s fixed,
typically ten-year, term. At the close of the partnership’s fixed term, liquidation is mandatory.
Indeed, the partnership will be in partial liquidation during much of its term because realized
profits from exiting an investment are required to be distributed to the limited partners on an
annual basis.11 The GP’s principal contribution to the venture capital fund is expertise, not
capital. This is reflected in the ratio of capital contributions. In most funds, the GP
contributes one percent of the fund’s capital, while the limited partner investors contribute the
remaining 99 percent.
The GP’s compensation is also skewed. The GP usually receives an annual
management fee for its services, but the fee is relatively small, usually 2.5 percent of
committed capital.12 The primary return to the general partner is a carried interest – that is, a
right to receive a specified percentage of profits realized by the partnership. Twenty percent is
9

Even if one treated the venture capitalist’s carried interest as a measure of the value of its human capital
contribution, it is still putting up less than 20 percent of the capital but receiving complete control.
10
See Halloran, et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 7, in Venture Capital and Public
Offering Negotiation (M. Halloran, L. Benton, R. Gunderson, Jr., & J. del Cavo eds. 1998). Paul Gompers
& Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Limited Partnerships, 39
L.& Econ. 463 (1996), examines the terms of such agreements.
11
Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491-92; Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 11, at 1-62 to 1-72.
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a common figure.13 The GP generally is paid its carried interest at the same time that
distributions are made to the limited partners, subject to two limitations. First, general partners
typically receive no distributions until the limited partners have received an amount equal to
their capital contributions, sometimes with interest. Second, distributions to the GP are
subject to certain “claw back” provisions that ensure that the order of distribution does not
affect the ultimate percentage of profits received by the GP.
The venture capital fund’s equity investments in portfolio companies typically take the
form of convertible preferred stock.14 While not required by the formal legal documents, the
fund is also expected to make important non-cash contributions to the portfolio company.
These contributions consist of management assistance, corresponding to that provided by
management consultants; intensive monitoring of the portfolio company’s performance which
provides an objective view to the entrepreneur; and the use of the fund’s reputation to give the
portfolio company credibility with potential customers, suppliers, and employees.15 While
each investment will have a “lead” investor who plays the primary role in monitoring and
advising the portfolio company, commonly the overall investment is syndicated with other
12

Id., at 491; In most cases, the agreement provides for a breakpoint above which the management fee is
reduced, either on funds under management of number of years after the partnership's formation. Halloran,
et al., Limited Partnership Agreement, supra note 7.
13
Sahlman, supra note 7, at 491; Halloran, et al., Agreement of Limited Partnership, supra note 7, at 1-46;
Paul Gompers & Joshua Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle 32 (2000).
14
Paul Gompers, Ownership and Control in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Examination of Convertible
Securities in Venture Capital Investments, Harvard Business School Working Paper (Sept. 1997); Sahlman,
supra note 7, at 36. Steven Kaplan & Pers Stromberg report that convertible preferred stock was used in 95
percent of a sample of 200 financing rounds in 118 portfolio companies made by 14 venture capital firms
between 1996 and 1999. Steven Kaplan & Pers Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real
World, NBER Working Paper 7660 (April 2000). Ronald Gilson and David Schizer argue that this
consistency is driven by the tax efficiency of this capital structure in delivering high powered incentives to
management. Ronald J. Gilson & David Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital Structure: A Tax
Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock (Working Paper, March 2002, forthcoming, Harvard L. Rev.).
This paper is available at http://papers:ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=301225.
15
Bernard Black & Ronald Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks versus
Stock Markets 243, 252-255 (1998); Thomas Hellman, Venture Capitalists: The Coaches of Silicon Valley,
in The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Chong-Moon Lee, W.F.
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venture capital funds that invest in the portfolio company at the same time and on the same
terms.16
The initial venture capital investment usually will be insufficient to fund the portfolio
company’s entire business plan. Accordingly, investment will be "staged." A particular
investment round will provide only the capital the business plan projects as necessary to
achieve specified milestones set out in the business plan.17 While first round investors expect
to participate in subsequent investment rounds,18 often they are not contractually obligated to
do so even if the business plan’s milestones are met; the terms of later rounds of investment
are negotiated at the time the milestones are met and the prior investment exhausted. Like the
provision of non-capital contributions, implicit, not explicit contract typically governs the
venture capital fund’s right and obligation to provide additional rounds of financing if the
portfolio company performs as expected. The venture capital fund’s implicit right to
participate in subsequent rounds – by contrast to its implicit obligation to participate – is
protected by an explicit right of first refusal.19

Miller, M. Gong Hancock & H.S. Rowen eds; 2000); Thomas Hellman & Manju Puri, Venture Capital and
the Professionalization of Start-up Firms: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. Fin. 169 (2002).
16
Josh Lerner, The Syndication of Venture Capital, 23 Fin. Mngmnt. 16, 18 (1994).
17
See Paul A. Gompers, Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital, 50 J. Fin.
1461 (1995).
18
Sahlman, supra note 7, at 475, reports that venture capital funds invest one-third of their capital in new
investments and two-thirds in later round financing of companies already in their portfolios.
19
Kaplan and Stromberg report that some 15 percent of the financing rounds in their sample conditioned
disbursement of a portion of the round on explicit contingencies. Many of these, however, are not
inconsistent with the unconstrained option to abandon analysis in the text. First, in some number of these
instances, subsequent financing was contingent on “no material deviation” from the business plan. Kaplan
& Stromberg, supra note 14, at Table 6. While such a formulation does operate to make exercise of the
option to abandon reviewable by a court, it hardly represents state contingent contracting and still leaves
the venture capitalist with a great deal of discretion. Since material changes in a business plan are
predictable given the nature of an early stage business, in most cases the material deviation contingency
will collapse into a pure option to abandon. Second, contingencies are keyed to readily observable and
verifiable events like the issuance of a patent, or the hiring of a chief executive officer, again instances
when a specific uncertainty can be specified and its resolution observed. Finally, Kaplan and Stromberg do
not suggest that the venture capitalists are committed to provide future financing rounds even in the
minority of rounds where explicit contingencies are found. Taken as a whole, their data leaves intact the
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A critical feature of the governance structure created by the venture capital fund’s
investment in the portfolio company is the disproportionate allocation of control to the fund.20
In direct contrast to the familiar Berle-Means governance structure of outside investors having
disproportionately less control than equity, the governance structure of a venture capitalbacked early stage, high technology company allocates to the venture capital investors
disproportionately greater control than equity. It is common for venture capital investors to
have the right to name a majority of a portfolio company’s directors even though their stock
represents less than a majority of the portfolio company’s voting power.21 Additionally, the
portfolio company will have the benefit of a series of contractual negative covenants that
require the venture capital investors’ approval before the portfolio company can take
important business decisions, such as acquisition or disposition of significant amounts of
assets, or a material deviation from the business plan. The extent of these negative covenants
is related to whether the venture capital investors have control of the board of directors; board
control acts as a partial substitute for covenant restrictions.22
These formal levers of control are complemented by the informal control elements that
result from the staged financing structure. Because a financing round will not provide funds

general proposition that venture financing is staged, without binding future commitments by existing
venture investors.
20
Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14.
21
In Gomper’s sample of portfolio company investments, venture capital investors on average controlled
the portfolio company’s board of directors, but held only 41 percent of the equity. Id. The venture capital
fund’s right to select a specified number of directors is contained in the portion of the portfolio company’s
articles of incorporation that sets out the rights, preferences and privileges of the convertible preferred
stock the investors receive. This portion of the articles will typically be added by amendment
simultaneously with the closing of the venture capital investment. L. Benton & Robert Gunderson, Jr.,
Portfolio Company Investments: High-Tech Corporation, in Venture Capital and Public Offering
Negotiation (M. Halloran, L. Benton, R. Gunderson, Jr., & J. del Cavo eds. 1998), sets out a standard form
of restated articles of incorporation in connection with a convertible preferred stock venture capital
financing.
22
See Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14. The negative covenants are contained in a
different closing document, the investors rights agreement. Benton & Gunderson, supra note 21, sets out a
form of investors rights agreement with illustrative negative covenants.
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sufficient to complete the portfolio company’s business plan, staged financing in effect
delegates to the investors, in the form of the decision whether to provide additional financing,
the decision whether and how to continue the company’s project.23
Two final characteristics of investments in portfolio companies concern their terms
and their expected performance. While these are not short-term investments, neither are they
expected to be long-term. Because venture capital limited partnerships have limited, usually
10 year terms,24 GP’s have a strong incentive to cause the fund’s portfolio company
investments to become liquid as quickly as possible. Assuming that the GP has invested all of
a fund’s capital by the midpoint of the fund’s life, the GP then must seek to raise additional
capital for a new fund in order to remain in the venture capital business. Because the
performance of a GP’s prior funds will be an important determinant of its ability to raise
capital for a new fund, early harvesting of a fund’s investments will be beneficial.25 Venture
capital funds exit successful investments by two general methods: taking the portfolio
company public through an initial public offering of its stock (an “IPO”); or selling the
portfolio company to another firm. The likelihood of exit by an IPO or a sale has differed
over different periods. Between 1984 and 1990, 396 venture capital-backed firms went
public, while 628 such firms were sold to other firms before going public. Between 1991 and
1996, the order reversed, with 1059 firms going public and 524 being sold.26 It is also
common for the terms of a venture capital preferred stock investment to give the venture
capital fund the right to require the portfolio company to redeem its stock. However,
23

Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14; Anat Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, Robust Financial
Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists, 49 J. Fin. 371, 371 (1994).
24
Halloran, et al., supra note 7, at 1-20,
25
Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 255-57. This incentive may cause a GP without a performance record
with prior funds to harvest investments earlier than would be optimal for the investors in order to establish
a record sufficient to allow the raising of a new fund. See Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14.
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redemption does not operate as a viable exit mechanism because portfolio companies lack the
funds to affect the redemption.27 Such put rights are better understood as a control device that
can force the portfolio company to accommodate the fund’s desire to exit by way of IPO or
sale.
The fact that portfolio company investments are of limited duration rather than long
term is critical to the operation of the venture capital market.28 The non-cash contributions
made by the venture capital fund to the portfolio company – management assistance,
monitoring, and service as a reputational intermediary – share a significant economy of scope
with its provision of capital. The portfolio company must evaluate the quality of the fund’s
proffered management assistance and monitoring, just as potential employees, suppliers and
customers must evaluate the fund’s representations concerning the portfolio company’s
quality. Combining financial and nonfinancial contributions enhances the credibility of the
information the venture capital fund proposes to provide the portfolio company and third
parties. Put simply, the venture capital fund bonds the accuracy of its information with its
investment.
The importance of the portfolio company investment’s limited duration reflects the
fact that the venture capital fund’s non-cash contributions have special value to early stage
companies. As the portfolio company gains its own experience and develops its own
reputation, the value of the venture capital fund’s provision of those elements declines. By the
time a portfolio company succeeds and the venture capital fund’s exit from the investment is
possible, the fund’s non-cash contributions can be more profitably invested in a new round of
26

Black & Gilson, supra note 15, at 248 (Table 1); Paul Gompers, Grandstanding in the Venture Capitals
Industry, 42 J.Fin. Econ. 133 (1996).
27
Black & Gilson, supra note 15; Gompers, Ownership & Control, supra note 14. Kaplan & Stromberg,
supra note 14, report redemption rights in 84 percent of the financing rounds in their sample.
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early stage companies. But because of the economies of scope between cash and non-cash
contributions, recycling the venture capital fund’s non-cash contributions also requires
recycling its cash contributions. Exit from a fund’s investments in successful portfolio
companies thus serves to recycle its cash and, therefore, its associated non-cash contributions
from successful companies to early stage companies.
The risk associated with portfolio company investments is reflected in the variability
of returns. While some investments return many multiples of the original investment, a survey
of the performance of venture capital-backed companies, not limited to early stage technology
companies and therefore presenting less uncertainty than the category of investments that
concern us here, reports wide variation in returns. In the sample studied, 50 percent of the
total return was provided by only 6.8 percent of the investments. Over a third of the
investments resulted in partial or total loss.29
II. The Economics of Venture Capital Contracting: the Special Problems of
Uncertainty, Information Asymmetry, and Agency Costs
All financial contracts respond to three central problems: uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and opportunism in the form of agency costs. The special character of venture
capital contracting is shaped by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology
companies presents these problems in extreme form.30 Precisely because the portfolio

28

This discussion draws on Black & Gilson, supra note 15.
Venture Economics, Exiting Venture Capital Investments (1988)[This high variance is confirmed by a
more recent econometric study. See John H. Cochran, The Risk and Return of Venture Capital, NBER
Working Paper 8066 (Jan. 2001) (“Venture Capital returns are like options; they have a small chance of a
huge pay off.”).
30
George Triantis makes the apt point that bank financing of mature firms has functional parallels to
venture capital contracting. For example, lines of credit that can be cancelled by the lender is a form of
staged financing. George Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of Venture Capital, 68 U.Chi. L.
Rev. 305, 306 (2001). However, the combination of the portfolio company’s negative cash flow, as well
as the more extreme form of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency leads to the use of equity-like
instruments and a level of control quite different from banking practice. This is consistent with the fact that
“Venture” funding in Europe by banks is characterized by late stage investments in low technology
29
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company is at an early stage, uncertainty concerning future performance is magnified.
Virtually all of the important decisions bearing on the company’s success remain to be made,
and most of the significant uncertainties concerning the outcome of the company’s efforts
remain unresolved. Additional uncertainty concerns the quality of the company’s
management, which takes on heightened importance because so large a portion of the
portfolio company’s value depends on management’s future decisions. Finally, the
technology base of the portfolio company’s business exacerbates the general uncertainty by
adding scientific uncertainty.
The same factors expand the information asymmetries between potential investors and
entrepreneurs, as intentions and abilities are far less observable than actions already taken.
Similarly, the fact that the portfolio company’s technology involves cutting edge science
assures that a substantial information asymmetry in favor of the entrepreneur even if the
venture capital fund employs individuals with advanced scientific training.
Finally, the importance of future managerial decisions in an early stage company
whose value depends almost entirely on future growth options, creates potentially very large
agency costs,31 which are in turn amplified by the significant variance associated with an early
stage, high technology company’s expected returns. Because the entrepreneur’s stake in a
portfolio company with venture capital financing can be fairly characterized as an option, the
entrepreneur’s interests will sharply diverge from those of the venture capital investors,
especially with respect to the risk level and duration of the investment.32

industries – circumstances when these contracting problems are more muted. See Mayer, Schoors &
Yafeh, supra note 3.
31
Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 14.
32
For a discussion on the characterization of a corporate stock as an option, see Fischer Black & Myron
Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J.Pol. Econ. 637 (1973); Stewart Myers,
Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J.Fin. Econ. 147 (1977). The application of option pricing

14

The organizational and contractual structure of the U.S. venture capital market
responds to this trio of problems. The effectiveness of the response serves to make the venture
capital market feasible. Absent a workable response, the extremity of uncertainty, information
asymmetry, and agency problems likely would raise the cost of external capital to a point of
market failure, leading to a similar collapse in the formation of early stage, high technology
companies. Because of the link between firm size and innovation,33 institutional and
contractual techniques thus have an important influence on the successful commercialization
of cutting edge science. Research and development by large companies with access to the
public capital markets simply is not a substitute for the activities of early stage companies,
financed through the private equity market, and dependent on contractual solutions to the
problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry and agency costs.34
The organizational and contractual techniques observed in the venture capital market
reflect three basic characteristics. First, very high power incentives for all participants –
investors, GPs, and entrepreneurs – are coupled with very intense monitoring.35 Second, the
organizational and contractual structure reflects the use of both explicit and implicit contracts.
Thus, the governance structure of both the portfolio company and the venture capital fund is
composed of market as well as formal aspects. Third, a pivotal aspect of this mix of formal
and market governance, especially repeat play and reputation mechanisms, is that the two
contracting nodes which comprise the venture capital market – the venture capital fund limited

analysis to transactional and contractual structuring is developed in Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black,
The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions Ch. 7 (2d ed. 1995).
33
See Lerner & Kortum, note 1, supra.
34
See Joseph Bankman & Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-ups?, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289 (1999) (discussion of
advantages of start-up form).
35
This is consistent with Milgrom & Roberts “monitoring intensity principle,” which predicts that because
intense incentives give rise not only to incentives to perform but also to incentives to cheat, intense
incentives require a significant investment in monitoring. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Economics,
Organization & Management, Ch. 7 (1992).
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partnership agreement and the portfolio company investment contract – are determined
simultaneously. As we will see, this braiding of the two relationships facilitates the resolution
of problems internal to each.
This Part shows how multiple forms of incentive and monitoring techniques, including
contractual, control, and market mechanisms, operate in connection with each contracting
node to resolve the problems of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency associated
with early stage, high technology financing. We consider first the venture capital fundportfolio company contract and then turn to the investor-venture capital fund limited
partnership agreement. Finally, we consider the importance of the braiding of these two
contracts.
A. The Venture Capital Fund-Portfolio Company Contract
Five organizational and contractual techniques discussed in Part I – staged financing,
allocation of elements of control, form of compensation, the role of exit, and reliance on
implicit contracts – respond to the problems posed by financial contracting in the face of
extreme forms of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs.
1. Staged Financing. By giving the investor a valuable option to abandon, the
staged financing structure discussed in Part I responds directly to the uncertainty associated
with contracting for early stage, high technology investments. The milestones in the business
plan are keyed to events that, when they occur, reveal important information and thereby
reduce the uncertainty associated with the project’s ultimate success. Thus, a first milestone
may be the creation of an operating prototype, which eliminates uncertainty about the
portfolio company’s ability to reduce its science to a commercial product. The decision about
additional investment is then made only after the passage of time and performance has
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replaced projection with fact. The result is to reduce the uncertainty associated with the
funding of further rounds of investment.36
Without more, however, staged financing does not increase the expected value of the
portfolio company's project. To be sure, the investor receives an option to abandon, but the
value of that option to the recipient is exactly balanced by the cost of the option to its writer,
the entrepreneur. Absent an unrealistic assumption about investor risk aversion, merely
shifting exogenous uncertainty from the investor to the entrepreneur does not create value.37
For this to occur, staged financing must accomplish something more.
The first respect in which staged financing creates, rather than merely transfers, value
is its reduction in the agency problems associated with the entrepreneur’s management of the
portfolio company’s operation. Staged financing aligns the interests of the venture capital
fund and the entrepreneur by creating a substantial performance incentive. If the portfolio
company does not meet the milestone whose completion was funded in the initial round of
financing, the venture capital fund has the power to shut the project down by declining to fund
the project’s next round.38 Even if the venture capital fund chooses to continue the portfolio
company’s project by providing another round of financing, a performance penalty still can be
imposed by assigning the portfolio company a lower value in the new round. To be sure, the
portfolio company may seek financing from other sources if the existing investors decline to
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Brealey & Myers contains an accessible discussion of how to value the option to abandon. Richard A.
Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance, 622-25 (6th ed. 2000).
37
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go forward, or are willing to go forward only at an unfavorable price, but the overall
contractual structure significantly reduces the availability of a market alternative.
First, potential investors know they are being solicited only because investors in the
prior round are dissatisfied with the portfolio company’s performance. Second, the investors
rights agreement gives the venture capital fund a right of first refusal with respect to future
financing that serves as a substantial deterrent to potential alternative investors. Such an
investor will be reluctant to make the outlay to acquire the information necessary to deciding
whether to make an investment knowing that that investment will be significantly reduced if
the terms negotiated turn out to be attractive, since the existing investors will have the right to
take part or all of the transaction for themselves. The result is a serious winner’s curse
problem. The potential investor can anticipate that if the price negotiated is attractive, the
existing investors will opt to make the investment themselves. Thus, the potential investor
knows that it will be allowed to make the investment only if the existing investors, who have
better information about the project, believe that the investment is unattractive.
Staged financing also reduces agency costs by shifting the decision whether to
continue the project from the entrepreneur to the venture capital fund. Because of the optionlike character of the entrepreneur’s interest in the portfolio company, she will go forward with
the project under conditions that favor her and disfavor the venture capital fund. Shifting this
decision to the venture capital fund reduces this source of agency cost.
The incentive created by staged financing in turn operates to reduce uncertainty in a
manner that creates value, rather than merely shifting it from the investor to the entrepreneur.
While staged financing only shifts risk with respect to exogenous uncertainty – that is,
uncertainty which is outside the parties’ capacity to influence – it actually can serve to reduce
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a different kind of uncertainty. Some uncertainty associated with the success of the portfolio
company’s project is endogenous: it can be influenced by the entrepreneur’s actions. Put
differently, the likelihood of the portfolio company’s success is in part a function of the effort
expended. By increasing the incentives to expend effort, staged financing reduces this
element of uncertainty.
That brings us to the effect of staged financing on the information asymmetry between
the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur. Staged financing serves to bridge the
information gap in two important ways. First, every incentive has an information related flip
side that responds to adverse selection problems. In deciding which portfolio companies to
finance, the venture capital fund has to distinguish between good and bad entrepreneurs under
circumstances in which an entrepreneur has better information about her own skills than does
the investor. Because the incentive created by staged financing is more valuable to a good
entrepreneur than a bad one, an entrepreneur’s willingness to accept an intense incentive is a
signal of the entrepreneur’s difficult to observe skills. The signal is particularly important for
early stage and high technology portfolio companies because the absence of a performance
history and the technical nature of the projects makes the entrepreneur’s skills particularly
difficult to observe.39
Staged financing reduces information asymmetry in a second way by its impact on the
credibility of the projections contained in the entrepreneur’s business plan. These projections
are critical to valuing the portfolio company and therefore pricing the venture capital fund’s
investment. Yet, the entrepreneur obviously has better information concerning the accuracy of
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Conceptually, the signal will result in a separating equilibrium, in which only high quality entrepreneurs
will accept the incentive, when the low quality entrepreneurs’ alternatives are more valuable to a low
quality entrepreneur than the incentive contract. See Gompers, Ownership and Control, supra note 11,
Edward Lazear, Salaries and Piece – Rates, 59 J. Bus. 405 (1986).
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the business plan’s projections of timing, costs, and likelihood of success. Without more, the
entrepreneur has an obvious incentive to overstate the project's prospects. By accepting a
contractual structure that imposes significant penalties if the entrepreneur fails to meets
specified milestones based on the business plan’s projections -- the venture capital fund's
option to abandon then becomes exercisable -- the entrepreneur makes those projections
credible.
At this point, it is helpful to note a more general contracting problem associated with
the allocation of discretion between parties to an agreement. Discretion creates the potential
for the party possessing it to impose agency costs. Staged financing, like other organizational
and contractual techniques we will consider, responds to agency problems that result from
entrepreneur discretion by shifting that discretion to the venture capital fund. However, this
technique has a built in limitation, which we might call the principle of the conservation of
discretion. Without more, shifting discretion from the entrepreneur to the fund does not
eliminate the potential for agency costs; it merely shifts the chance to act opportunistically to
the fund. For example, staged financing coupled with a right of first refusal made potent by
high information costs allows the venture capital fund to behave opportunistically in
negotiating the price of a second round of financing. The fund is in a position to exploit its
monopsony power by reducing the value assigned to the portfolio company even though it has
met its projections.40 In such settings, the goal is to shift discretion to that party whose misuse
of it can be most easily constrained, here the venture capital fund.41 As will appear, misuse of
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the discretion shifted to the venture capital fund is policed by market forces in the venture
capital market, whose functioning is crucial to the feasibility of the entire organizational and
contractual structure.
2. Control. The venture capital fund-portfolio company contract stands the
Berle-Means problem on its head. Instead of investors having disproportionately less control
than equity as in public corporations, the venture capital fund has disproportionately more
control than equity. Like staged financing, this allocation of control responds to the problems
of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency associated with early stage, high
technology investments.
Extreme uncertainty concerning the course and outcome of the project stage being
financed creates discretion. The presence of uncertainty means that the financing contract is
necessarily incomplete; an explicit stage contingent contract that specifies what action should
be taken in response to all possible events cannot be written. Thus, the contractual structure
must deal with uncertainty by means of a governance structure: creating a process that will
determine the response to an unexpected event. The particular allocation of discretion
between the fund and the portfolio company reflects the influence of concerns over both
agency and information asymmetry.
Two types of control are allocated to the venture capital fund as a response to agency
and information asymmetry problems. First, as we have seen, staged financing allocates an
important periodic lever of control to the venture capital fund. By reserving to itself the
decision whether to fund the portfolio company’s next milestone, the venture capital fund
takes control over the continuation decision. This power, in turn, gives the venture capital
fund the incentive to make the investment in monitoring necessary to evaluate the portfolio
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company’s overall performance over the initial funding period. In the absence of the power to
act in response to what it discovers, the venture capital fund would have no reason to expend
time and resources in the kind of monitoring necessary to balance the intense incentives
created to align the two parties’ interests.
Second, giving the venture capital fund disproportionate representation or even control
of the portfolio company’s board of directors, and the restriction of the entrepreneur’s
discretion through the use of negative covenants, gives the fund interim control – the power to
act to reduce agency costs in the period between financing rounds. In its most extreme form,
the venture capital fund’s interim control carries with it the power to replace the entrepreneur
as the portfolio company’s chief executive officer. As with the allocation of periodic control,
the allocation of interim control gives the venture capital fund the incentive to monitor the
portfolio company’s performance during the course of reaching a funding milestone, and in
response to the unexpected events generated by pervasive uncertainty. The discretion
unavoidably given to the portfolio company’s day to day managers by the occurrence of
unexpected events is policed by the disproportionate control and resulting monitoring activity
allocated to the venture capital fund.
The periodic and interim monitoring encouraged by the disproportionate allocation of
control to the venture capital fund also serves to reduce the last of the contracting problems –
information asymmetry between the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur. The balance of
information between the parties is not static as the portfolio company moves forward on its
business plan. Ongoing learning by the entrepreneur increases the information disparity and
therefore the entrepreneur's discretion, which in turn increases agency costs. Ongoing
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monitoring by the venture capital fund, made possible by the disproportionate allocation of
control, balances that influence.
Finally, as with staged financing, the allocation of control serves to reduce information
asymmetry by providing the entrepreneur the opportunity to signal her type. Giving the
venture capital fund the power to terminate the entrepreneur in the event of poor performance
gives the entrepreneur a powerful incentive to perform. The flip side of this incentive is a
signal. By her willingness to subject herself to this penalty for poor performance, the
entrepreneur credibly provides information to the venture capital fund about her own skills.
3. Compensation. The structure of the entrepreneur’s compensation responds
primarily to agency costs and information asymmetry problems. Perhaps more starkly than
with any other organizational or contractual technique, the portfolio company’s compensation
structure creates extremely high powered performance incentives that serve to align the
incentives of the portfolio company management and the venture capital fund. In essence, the
overwhelming percentage of management’s compensation is dependent on the portfolio
company’s success. Low salaries are offset by the potential for a large increase in value of the
entrepreneur’s stock ownership, and by the award of stock options to other management
members. The performance incentive is further heightened by the practice of requiring the
entrepreneur and other members of management to accept the imposition of a staged vesting
requirement on some or all of their stock or stock options.42 The vesting requirement gives
the portfolio company the right to purchase a portion of the entrepreneur’s or other
management’s stock, at a favorable price, if employment terminates prior to a series of
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entrepreneur vesting requirements.
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specified dates. It also restricts exercise of options until after the manager has completed a
series of employment anniversaries, following each of which an additional number of options
both are exercisable and no longer subject to forfeiture if employment terminates.43
While aligning the interests of the venture capital fund and entrepreneur in some
circumstances, the intensity of these incentives can also lead to agency costs in others. In
particular, the option-like characteristics of the portfolio company’s compensation structure
can lead the entrepreneur to increase the risk associated with the portfolio company’s future
returns, because the venture capital fund will bear a disproportionate share of the increased
downside but share only proportionately in the upside. Thus, the intensity of the performance
incentives created by the compensation structure gives rise to a corresponding incentive for
the venture capital fund to monitor the portfolio company’s performance. This monitoring,
together with the signaling properties of the entrepreneur’s willingness to accept such
powerful incentives, also serve to reduce information asymmetries.
4. Exit. Another powerful incentive is created for the entrepreneur by the
terms of the disproportionate allocation of control to the venture capital fund. On the plausible
assumption that the transfer of control to the venture capital is costly to the entrepreneur,44 the
control structure created by the venture capital fund’s investment gives the entrepreneur a
valuable call option on control.45 In effect, the venture capital fund and the entrepreneur enter
into a combination explicit and implicit contract that returns to the entrepreneur the
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disproportionate control transferred to the venture capital fund if the portfolio company is
successful. 46 The explicit portion of the contract is reflected in the terms of the convertible
preferred stock that provide the venture capital fund its disproportionate board representation,
and in those of the investors’ rights agreement that contains the negative covenants requiring
venture capital fund approval of important operating decisions. Both documents typically
provide for the termination of these levers of control on the completion of an IPO of a
specified size and at a specified price. The terms of the preferred stock almost universally
require conversion into common stock, with the resulting disappearance of special board
representation, on a public offering. The negative covenants also expire on an IPO.47
The implicit portion of the contract operationalizes the definition of success that
makes the entrepreneur’s call option on control exercisable. By triggering automatic
conversion on an IPO, the measure of success is delegated to independent investment bankers
who are in the business of identifying venture capital-backed companies successful enough to
be taken public,48 and whose own incentives make their ex post determination of success
credible ex ante. As we will see in the next section, it also allocates to the market enforcement
of the venture capital fund’s implicit promise to agree to an IPO when one is available to the
portfolio company and the entrepreneur exercises her call option on control by requesting one.
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5. Reliance on Implicit Contract: The Role of the Reputation Market. Crucial
elements of the organizational and contractual techniques that respond to uncertainty,
information asymmetry, and agency costs in the venture capital fund-portfolio company
relationship, have at their core the transfer of discretion from the entrepreneur to the venture
capital fund. Staged financing, by giving the venture capital fund an option to abandon,
transfers the continuation decision from the entrepreneur to the fund. Board control by the
venture capital fund, including the power to dismiss the entrepreneur herself, disproportionate
to its equity, also transfers to the fund the capacity to interfere in the portfolio company’s day
to day business. As a result, the effectiveness of these techniques is subject to the
conservation of discretion principle. Reducing the agency costs of the entrepreneur’s
discretion by transferring it to the venture capital fund also transfers to the venture capitalist
the potential for agency costs – the opportunity to use that discretion opportunistically with
respect to the entrepreneur.
For example, giving the venture capital fund an option to abandon gives the venture
capital fund an incentive to monitor, gives the entrepreneur an incentive to perform, and
reduces agency costs by shifting the continuation decision to the venture capitalist. But when
coupled with the venture capital fund’s right of first refusal, this transfer of discretion also
creates agency costs on the part of the venture capital fund. What prevents the venture capital
fund from opportunistically offering to provide the financing necessary for the portfolio
company’s next stage only at an unfairly low price, relying on a right of first refusal to restrict
the entrepreneur’s access to other sources of funding?49 Similarly, the transfer of
disproportionate control to the venture capital fund also creates the potential for opportunism
by the fund. To align incentives, the entrepreneur’s returns from the portfolio company’s
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project take the form of appreciation in the value of her portfolio company stock and stock
options. However, the venture capital fund’s power to terminate the entrepreneur, coupled
with the vesting requirements that on her termination both give the portfolio company a
favorably priced option to purchase the entrepreneur’s stock and cancel all unvested options,
gives the venture capital fund the discretion to behave opportunistically. What prevents the
venture capital fund from unfairly terminating the entrepreneur so as to secure for itself the
returns that had been promised the entrepreneur?
The conservation of discretion principle counsels that discretion be vested in the party
whose behavior is more easily policed. In the context of the venture capital fund-portfolio
company relationship, the presence of an effective reputation market with respect to the GP’s
characteristics provides the policing that supports the transfer of discretion to the venture
capital fund. Put differently, the feasibility of the explicit contract for venture capital
financing, made up of hundreds of pages of carefully drafted language, depends on the
operation of an implicit contract whose terms and enforcement rest with a market.
For a reputation market to operate, three attributes must be present. First, the party
whose discretion will be policed by the market must anticipate repeated future transactions;
market penalties for breach of the implicit require future dealings. Second, participants in the
market must have shared expectations of what constitutes appropriate behavior by the party to
whom discretion has been transferred; that is, the terms of the implicit contract must be
observable to market participants. Finally, those who will deal with the advantaged party in
the future must be able to observe whether that party has behaved in past dealings in
conformity with shared expectations; that is, compliance or breach of the implicit contract
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must be observable.50 All three of these attributes appear present in the venture capital
market.
Although it is unlikely that a GP will have future dealings with the same
entrepreneur,51 as we have seen the GP will anticipate raising successor venture capital funds,
which in turn will require future dealings with different entrepreneurs in connection with the
investing the new funds’ capital. The requirements of shared expectations of proper conduct,
and the observability of a GP’s satisfaction of those expectations, also appear to be met in the
venture capital market. The community of venture capital funds is relatively concentrated,52
and remarkably localized. For example, the offices of a significant percentage of U.S. venture
capital funds are found along a short strip of Sand Hill Road in Silicon Valley.53 Moreover,
venture capital funds typically concentrate their investments in portfolio companies
geographically proximate to the fund’s office.54 This geographical concentration of providers
and users of venture capital facilitates satisfaction of the informational element of the structure
of a reputation model. Saxanian notes that geographical proximity has fostered in Silicon
Valley extremely efficient informal transfers of information concerning the performance of
50
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GPs and entrepreneurs.55 Credible accounts of opportunistic behavior by particular GPs can
be expected to circulate quickly among members of the entrepreneur community who must
select a GP with whom to deal, and among members of the GP community, who must
compete among themselves for the opportunity to invest in the most promising portfolio
companies and therefore have an interest in noting and transmitting to the entrepreneur
community instances of misbehavior by a rival.
B. The Investor-Venture Capital Fund Contract
In this Part, we turn to the investor-venture capital fund contract. How do the
organizational and contractual techniques discussed in Part I – virtually complete control
vested in the GP, highly incentivized compensation, mandatory distribution of realized
investments, and mandatory liquidation after a fixed term56 – respond to the problems of
financial contracting in the face of extreme forms of uncertainty, information asymmetry, and
agency costs?57
1. Control. Organizing the venture capital fund as a limited partnership serves
to vest virtually complete control in the GP. Short of participation in largely inconsequential

of Venture Capital Investments (Working Paper, Dec. 1999), available on SSRN at
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advisory committees and the right, typically restricted by the limited partnership agreement, to
replace the GP, the legal rules governing limited partnerships prevent investors from
exercising control over the central elements of the venture capital fund’s business. Most
important, the investors are prohibited from insisting on an approval right of the GP’s
investment decisions. Thus, the venture capital fund’s formal governance structure presents
an extreme version of the Berle-Means problem of the separation of ownership and control:
the GP receives control grossly disproportionate to either its one percent capital contribution
or its 20 percent carried interest.
The efficiency explanation for the allocation of control to the GP reflects in the first
instance the extreme uncertainty and information asymmetry associated with investing in early
stage, high technology portfolio companies. By investing through a financial intermediary,
investors secure the benefit of the GP’s skill and experience, which help to reduce the level of
uncertainty and information asymmetry that must be addressed in the contract governing a
portfolio company’s investment. However, securing the benefit of the GP’s expertise comes
at a cost: the GP must be given the discretion necessary to exercise its skills and experience
on the investors’ behalf. And consistent with the principle of the conservation of discretion,
the allocation of control to the GP creates the potential for agency costs that must be addressed
by other elements of the venture capital fund’s organizational and contractual structure.
2. Compensation. The GP’s compensation structure is the front line response
to the potential for agency costs resulting from allocating to the GP the control necessary to
apply its skill and expertise on behalf of the investors. As discussed in Part I, the bulk of the
GP’s compensation comes in the form of a carried interest (20 percent of the venture capital
fund’s ultimate profits is a common figure) distributed to the general partner when realized
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profits are distributed to the investor limited partners. Thus, the compensation structure aligns
the GP’s interests in the fund’s success with those of the investors: the GP earns returns that
are proportional to those earned by the investors. However, other agency problems appear in
the details of the carried interest. For example, suppose that the first investment realized by
the venture capital fund yields a $1 million profit after a return to the investors of their $1
million investment. The GP’s share of the profit is $200,000. Now suppose that the next
investment realized loses $500,000, leaving cumulative profits from the two investments of
$500,000. If the GP keeps all of its first $200,000 distribution, then it ends up having received
not 20 percent of the venture capital fund’s profits from the two investments, but 40 percent
($200,000/$500,000). This would give the GP an incentive to realize profitable investments
before unprofitable investments, even if that meant realizing the profitable investments
prematurely. Various formulations of what are called “claw back” provisions respond to the
potential agency cost growing out of this element of uncertainty by in one fashion or another
either delaying the GP’s distribution, or holding back some portion of it, so that the GP's
carried interest can be finally calculated after performance is known.58
3. Mandatory Distributions and Fixed Term. While aligning the interests of
the GP and the investors, the intensity of the GP’s compensation incentive in turn creates a
different agency cost. The GP’s carried interest has option-like characteristics, which may
cause it to prefer investments of greater risk than the investors. This is especially true with
respect to the fund’s later investments if the early ones have done poorly. In that
circumstance, the GP actually may be best served by making negative net present value
investments if the investments are sufficiently risky. The same problem arises with respect to
operating decisions that concern a portfolio company that is doing poorly. Then the option58
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like character of the GP’s carried interest may align its interests more closely with those of the
entrepreneur whose compensation under the venture capital fund-portfolio company also has
option-like characteristics. In that circumstance, both the GP and the entrepreneur may prefer
a riskier operating strategy than would best serve investors.
The venture capital fund’s fixed term, together with the operation of the reputation
market, responds to this agency cost problem. The fund’s fixed term assures that at some
point the market will measure the GP’s performance, making readily observable the extent to
which the GP’s investment decisions favored increased risk over expected return. A GP’s
track record, as revealed by the performance of its previous funds, is the GP's principal tool for
persuading investors to invest in successor funds. Thus, the limited partnership’s fixed term
assures that opportunistic behavior by the GP with respect to either venture capital fund
investment decisions or portfolio company operating decisions will be punished through the
reputation market when it seeks to raise the successor funds that justify the GP’s investment in
skill and experience in the first place. The expectation of such a settling up helps support the
use of intense compensation incentives by constraining option-induced GP opportunism.
Mandatory distribution of the proceeds from realized investments and the venture
capital fund’s fixed term also respond to a different variety of agency costs resulting from the
allocation of control to the GP. Because the GP receives a fixed fee, typically in the range of
2.5 percent, of committed capital, the GP would have an incentive to keep capital within the
fund for as long as possible. If given the opportunity, the GP would simply reinvest the
proceeds of realized investments. Moreover, that opportunity would make it unnecessary for
GP’s to raise successor funds, the anticipation of which allows the reputation market to police
GP performance. Mandatory distribution of realized proceeds and a fixed term respond to this
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potential free cash flow problem. Both devices require that the GP allow the investors to
measure its performance against alternatives available in the market before it can continue
managing the investors' money. In this respect, mandatory distributions operate like debt in a
post-leveraged buyout company: profits must first be returned to investors before the
company can seek to reclaim them by persuading investors to make a new investment. The
fixed term operates like a contractually imposed takeover by forcing the GP to allow the
investors to choose whether the GP should continue to manage their funds. The
organizational and contractual structure assures that a time will come when market price
serves as the measure of the GP’s performance.59
C. Braiding of the Venture Capital Fund-Portfolio Company and the InvestorVenture Capital Fund Contracts
A final means by which the organizational and contractual structure of the venture
capital-portfolio company and investor-venture capital fund contracts responds to the
contracting problems posed by extreme uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs
is through the braiding of the two contracts. By braiding I mean the fact that the structure of
the two contracts are intertwined, each operating to provide an implicit term that supports the
other, and thereby increasing the contractual efficiency of both. This characteristic is
particularly apparent with respect to the role of exit and of the reputation market.
1. The Braiding of Exit. As we have seen, the obligation of exit from each of
the two contracts comprising the venture capital market – the fixed term of the investorventure capital fund contract, and the incentive to realize and then distribute the proceeds of
the investment that is the subject of the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract –
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responds to contracting problems presented by each of the relationships. Here the focus is on
how these two functions of exit complement each other. As we saw in Part I, by the time a
portfolio company succeeds, the venture capital fund’s non-cash contributions to a portfolio
company can be more profitably invested in a new round of early stage companies. But
because economies of scope link the provision of cash and non-cash contributions, recycling
the non-cash contributions requires the venture capital fund to exit: to recycle its cash
contribution from successful portfolio companies to new early stage companies.60 Moreover,
the venture capital fund’s exit provides the means to give the entrepreneur an important
performance incentive: a call option on control the exercise of which is implemented by the
venture capital fund’s realization of its investment in the portfolio company by means of an
IPO.
In turn, the recycling of investments from successful portfolio companies to new early
stage companies supports the investor-venture capital fund contract. Realizing portfolio
company investments provides a performance measure that lets investors evaluate the GP’s
skill and honesty, and to reallocate their funds to the GPs with the most successful
performance. And by providing the GP’s primary tool for persuading investors to provide
capital for successor funds, exit supports the core of the incentive structure that aligns the
interests of investors and the GP.
In sum, the braiding of the role of exit in the investor-venture capital fund contract and
the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract increases the efficiency of both contracts.
2. The Braiding of the Reputation Market. The venture capital fund-portfolio
company contract responds to a number of problems by shifting important elements of control
partnership structure was invented, never caught on. See Paul Gompers, The Rise and Fall of Venture
Capital, 23 Bus. & Econ. Hist. 1(1995).
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to the venture capital fund. The venture capital fund’s option to abandon resulting from staged
financing, its board representation and even control, and its power to replace the entrepreneur,
combine to reduce uncertainty and agency costs both by providing the entrepreneur powerful
performance incentives including a call option to regain control and by providing the venture
capital fund the means and therefore the incentive to monitor. In turn, the entrepreneur’s
willingness to transfer control, and to accept so heavily incentivized a contract structure,
reduces information asymmetry by signaling the entrepreneur’s type. However, each of these
transfers of discretion from the entrepreneur to the venture capital fund carries with it the
potential for opportunistic behavior by the fund. The entrepreneur is at risk in connection with
negotiations over the terms of the next round financing, in connection with the venture capital
fund’s exercise of control through board influence and its power to replace the entrepreneur,
and in connection with the fund’s ability not to honor the implicit call option on control it has
written. The efficiency of the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract therefore
requires a credible constraint on the venture capital fund’s misusing its transferred discretion.
The braiding of the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract with the investorventure-capital fund contract supports a reputation market that constrains opportunistic
behavior by the venture capital fund. Because the fund is unlikely to engage in repeated deals
with any particular entrepreneur, the reputation market constraint instead grows out of the
investor-venture capital fund contract. Because the GP needs to raise successor funds, it will
have to make investments in new portfolio companies run by other entrepreneurs. If a GP
behaves opportunistically toward entrepreneurs in connection with previous portfolio
company investments, it will lose access to the best new investments that, in turn, will make
raising successor funds more difficult. The impact of the GP's behavior toward current
60
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portfolio companies on the success of its future fund raising efforts serves to police the venture
capital fund’s exercise of the discretion transferred to it in the venture capital fund-portfolio
company contract. In turn, the investor-venture capital fund contract’s support of the transfer
of discretion to the fund by the venture capital fund-portfolio company contract helps reduce
uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency costs in contracting with the portfolio
company and therefore results in higher returns to investors. And this encourages investors to
reinvest in the GP’s successor funds. Again, the interaction between the two contracts
supports the efficiency of each.
III. The Engineering Problem
The canvas of the U.S. venture capital contracting structure in Parts I and II brings
me to the engineering problem. The central lesson to be learned from the U.S. venture
capital market is that it is overwhelmingly the product of private ordering – an extremely
effective contracting structure that covers the entire venture capital cycle, from initial
investment in the VC fund, to the VC fund’s investment in a portfolio company, to the
exit from the portfolio investment to allow the VC fund’s cash and non-cash investment
to be recycled.61 Can this model be replicated elsewhere? Who will be the engineer?
Can the government act as the engineer in creating a system that is driven by private
ordering?
The discussion must begin with a caveat. I have in mind a relatively restricted
engineering problem. Any form of effective capital market requires a range of social,
legal and economic institutions, such as honest courts, an effective auditing profession,
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and informational and reputational transparency, to function effectively.62 Because of the
braided aspect of venture capital contracting, the whole spectrum of foundational
institutions is important to the venture capital market. For present purposes, I will
assume away the more difficult problem of how to engineer the foundational structure of
capital markets, focusing instead on the more limited issue that is plainly of interest to
many nations and multinational entities like the EU and OECD: How to engineer a
venture capital market.
At this level, developing a venture capital market confronts a difficult
coordination problem that I will call simultaneity. A venture capital market requires the
simultaneous availability of three factors, the provision of any one of which is contingent
on the availability of the other two. A venture capital market requires entrepreneurs,
investors with the funds and the taste for high-risk, high return investments and, as the
discussion of U.S. venture capital contracting illustrates, a specialized financial
intermediary to serve as the nexus of a set of sophisticated contracts.
The nature of the simultaneity problem can be illustrated by a more familiar
example: the development of the U.S. credit card industry. For a market for credit cards
to develop, three factors were necessary. The industry required consumers who would
carry credit cards, merchants who would accept the cards, and a network of card issuers
that would provide the cards and the back office services necessary to their use. If any
two of the three elements were available, the third would be forthcoming. For example,
if one observes consumers who want credit cards and a network that will provide the
cards and the system, merchants will want to accept the cards. The same reasoning
applies with respect to any other permutation. The problem is in making the first two of
62
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the inputs available. The odd organizational form of the primary players in this market –
Visa and MasterCard – seems to me to have been shaped by the need to respond to this
problem. By organizing as (effectively) non-profit cooperatives open to any bank,
members could both cooperate in creating the network, while competing intensely at the
issuer level in order to attract customers and merchants.63
The government is the natural engineer to confront the venture capital
simultaneity problem. While the government did not play an instrumental role in the
development of the U.S. venture capital market, the idiosyncratic U.S. experience does
not provide an example for other countries seeking to establish a venture capital market
more quickly than through accretion. No institution other than the government has the
right incentive to invest in the public good that results from establishing a venture capital
market. The problem, however, is the mismatch of a government acting to create a
market in which it has no long-term role. The response, I will argue, reflects the lesson
of the U.S. experience and the character of the simultaneity problem. The government
can act to induce the development of the necessary specialized financial intermediaries
and also act to provide, in effect, seed capital, to the new market. That leaves the third
factor necessary to solve the venture capital market simultaneity problem – entrepreneurs.
Here the hypothesis is simply that the presence of a venture capital framework and
funding will induce entrepreneurs to reveal themselves.
An understanding of the governmental role in engineering a venture capital
market that I have in mind can be seen from examining governmental efforts in three
different countries: one early German failure that got every element wrong and whose
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failure highlights the shape of what is necessary for a successful government effort; a
more recent Israeli effort that got much of the structure right; and a current Chilean
program that was structured with precisely this analysis in mind. These examples are not
intended to be illustrative of the wide range of government efforts to create a venture
capital market. Rather, the goal is to highlight what is necessary for a successful effort.
A. The German “WFG” Experience
The German WFG program64 provides a fascinating example of an early effort to
create a national venture capital market that failed miserably. The nature of its failings,
and its mirror image of the core of U.S. venture capital contracting, provides important
guidance on the limits of governmental engineering.
Formed in 1975 at the insistence of the German federal government and with the
express goal of developing a German venture capital market, WFG began with 10 million
DM in funding, ultimately increased to 50 million DM, that was provided by 29 German
banks, including the largest banks and the leading savings and loan institutions. The
banks’ involvement was encouraged not just by governmental pressure, but also by a
generous government guarantee: the government insured up to 75 percent of WFG’s
losses. As an inducement to entrepreneurs, WFG’s return from a successful portfolio
company investment was capped by the requirement that the entrepreneur be granted a
call option to purchase WFG’s position at cost plus a moderate interest rate. Thus, WFG
had quite muted incentives to make successful investments. It was protected on the
downside by the government guarantee, and limited on the upside to a moderate interest
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rate – a low risk (because of the guarantee) and a low return (because of the call option)
investment, a strange vehicle indeed for investing in early stage, technology companies
whose essential characteristic is their high risk.
WFG’s governance structure reflected the program’s government origin – a
stakeholders’ dream of a compromise. WFG had a twelve person board, comprised of
three bank members, three government members representing the ministries of
commerce, finance, and research and development, two management consultants, and
two scientists. A mixed board committee selected the projects to be funded, pursuant to
quite general criteria that nonetheless pointed in the right direction. The focus was to be
on the innovative character of the project’s technology, the existence of attractive
commercial applications, and the quality of the entrepreneur.
WFG’s investments were structured to be passive, perhaps because the return
character of its investment gave it no incentive to be active. Only minority investments
were made, and WFG received no control rights at all, even over important decisions.
Consistent with this passive structure, WFG personnel provided no technological or
management assistance to their portfolio companies even though the board members
appeared to have the credentials to be useful.
Comparing U.S. venture capital practices with those of WFG reveals dramatic
differences along every important dimension. Indeed, it would have been difficult for
WFG to get the structure any more wrong.65
In the U.S., the venture capital contracting structure turns the Berle & Means
problem on its head. Instead of less control than equity, venture capital investors in the
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U.S. take significant control positions, more than proportional to their equity. Not only
do they obtain veto rights over major decisions, retain the continuation decision, and
often control a majority of the board, but they also retain the right to terminate the
entrepreneur. In contrast, WFG took a minority position in portfolio companies and
obtained no control rights. An example highlights the difference. A recent study of a
sample of Silicon Valley portfolio companies show that professional managers replace
more than half of founding entrepreneurs.66 WFG never replaced an entrepreneur.
Control and equity give U.S. venture capitalists the means and incentives to
monitor highly incentivized managers. A twenty percent carried interest based on a 1
percent capital contribution gives them a huge stake in the upside. The impact of
portfolio company failure on a venture capitalists’ ability to raise subsequent funds and,
hence, on the value of their human capital, assures that they also share the downside.
WFG lacked both the incentives to succeed and the means to monitor. Given the
government guarantee and the enterpreneurs’ call option, why should the banks bother to
monitor? In all events, WFG lacked levers of control to act even if monitoring led to
discovery of a problem. Control and equity also give U.S. venture investors the incentive
to provide non-capital inputs to portfolio companies. WFG provided nothing but its
initial capital investment.
The same dampening of WFG’s incentives plainly influenced project selection as
well. As already stressed, WFG’s position was largely insulated from a portfolio
company’s performance. Not surprisingly, the same incentive pattern repeated itself at

65

To some extent this comparison reflects a fair degree of hindsight bias: the U.S. venture capital
contracting structure had not yet crystallized in 1975. However, Becker and Hellmann report that the
deficiencies in the WFG structure were noted at the time. Becker & Hellmann, supra note 64.
66
Hellmann & Puri, supra note 15, at 82-3.

41

the level of the individual decision makers within WFG. No member of the board
selection committee was either rewarded or penalized for WFG performance.
In short, WFG was a government program that created a financial intermediary
that had no incentives, did not monitor, involved the government, through board
representation, in project selection and, not surprisingly, produced dismal results. Over
its lifetime, WFG experienced an internal rate of return of negative 25.07 percent. In
every year of its existence, proceeds from the government guarantee exceeded revenue
from investments. In terms of addressing the simultaneity problem, WFG generated
funds for venture investing, but created a hollow financial intermediary that was
incapable of playing the central role that the U.S. venture capital contracting system
contemplates. Keep in mind that a significant negative return for WFG necessarily
parallels significant failures for the entrepreneurs who WFG funded. A pattern of failure
will not call forth entrepreneurs.
B. The Israeli Yozma Program
In contrast to the early WFG program, a more recent Israeli program came closer
to getting the incentive structure right.67 Plainly influenced by the U.S. experience, the
Israeli government established Yozma Ltd. in 1993 with the intention of creating the
infrastructure for an Israeli venture capital market. In particular, Yozma created nine
venture capital funds, in which it invested along with private investors. The structure of
Yozma’s participation in these funds was quite different than both the German
government’s and the banks’ participation in WFG.
First, Yozma provided no guarantee against loss. Rather, Yozma provided capital
to the funds, matching up to 40 percent of the capital invested by private investors. Thus,
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unlike WFG, private investors and the fund’s managers bore their share of the downside
risk.
Second, the Yozma structure preserved intense performance incentives on the
upside. Like WGF, Yozma’s return on its investment was capped: the private investors
had a call option on Yozma’s investment at cost plus (i) a nominal interest rate and (ii)
and seven percent of the future profits from portfolio company investments in which the
fund was then invested. This cap, however, had very different incentive properties than
the cap on WFG’s return. Because Yozma’s investment was made in a venture capital
fund, rather than directly in the portfolio company as with WFG, and because the call
option was held by the other investors rather than by the entrepreneur as with WFG, the
returns to the financial intermediary were not capped at all. Rather, the cap served to
leverage the returns, and therefore the incentives, of the intermediary instead of
dampening them. WFG’s subsidy to the banks and to the entrepreneur eliminated any
incentive for WFG or its constituent banks to monitor the entrepreneur’s conduct. In
contrast, Yozma’s subsidy to other investors increased their incentive to assure that the
portfolio companies were carefully monitored.
Finally, Yozma did not make investment decisions.68 The fund’s managers
selected the portfolio companies in which the fund would invest. Thus, while Yozma’s
investments were passive like those of WFG, these passive investments were made
through funds whose managers and other investors were highly incentivized. In this
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critical respect, the Yozma structure tracked the U.S. pattern of interposing a highly
incentivized intermediary between passive investors and the portfolio company.
Yozma’s performance was consistent with this more highly incentivized
investment structure. Investment decisions were made by those who bore the
investment’s risk and return. The Yozma funds ultimately increased in size to over $200
million and in 1997 were successfully privatized.

C. The Current Chilean CORFU Program
A Chilean program begun in 2001, “designed to provide an incentive for the
development of venture capital funding in Chile,”69 takes the Yozma concept a step
further in the direction of the U.S. venture capital contracting model. The program
contemplates that a government agency, the Corporation for the Incentive of Production
(“CORFU”), will invest in privately managed venture capital funds organized roughly in
accordance with the U.S. model. The fund manager’s compensation has the same
structure as developed in the U.S. – a 2.5 percent fixed annual fee on assets under
management and a carried interest based on fund performance. Perhaps because of the
early stage of the Chilean venture capital market, the program has a number of features
that seem to be substitutes for the operation of a reputation market among venture
capitalists.
First, the CORFU program seeks to insure more direct investor monitoring of the
fund manager’s performance rather than relying only on the structure of the fund
manager’s incentives and its investment in reputation. Each fund must have at least five
unrelated investors holding at least ten percent of the fund’s equity each, or at least one
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institutional investor holding at least 20 percent of the equity. By requiring the presence
of large investors, the structure encourages internal monitoring of the fund manager.
Second, because the fund manager is likely to have a smaller investment in
reputation at this stage of the development of a national venture capital market, the
CORFU program requires a larger capital investment by the fund manager than the U.S.
pattern of a one percent capital contribution by the general partner. The Chilean program
requires the fund manager to invest at least fifteen percent of the fund manager’s total
assets in the managed fund. Note that the requirement is keyed to a percentage of the
fund manager’s assets, not of the fund’s assets, an effort plainly directed to insure that
even new fund managers – most local venture capitalists would necessarily be new –
have a direct share of the downside.
CORFU investment in qualifying venture capital funds takes the form of “loans”
that leverage the private investors’ and the fund manager’s equity stakes in the fund.
While denominated loans, the CORFU contribution is functionally preferred equity with
a cap on return. The loan accrues interest at 3 percent with a term equal to the shorter of
the life of the fund or 15 years. No interest or principal payment is due until the fund
makes a distribution to shareholders, and final payment occurs on liquidation. CORFU
has a distribution preference, receiving on liquidation first its principal and interest,
following which the private investors receive an amount equal to their original
investment.70 Then CORFU receives an amount equal to an annualized return of nine
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percent on the principal of the loan. The remaining funds are paid to the private investors
and the fund manager.
Like the Yozma program, the Chilean program provides a subsidy to fund
investors, including fund managers, through capping its return on its investment. Again,
unlike the WFG program, the key feature of the CORFU program is its focus on the
incentives of the financial intermediary. CORFU remains a passive investor in a venture
capital fund whose investment structure, patterned after the U.S. model, is plainly
intended to encourage the kind of active venture capital fund – portfolio company
relationship found in the U.S.71
IV. A Template for Government Engineering of a Venture Capital Market
These three examples, together with the lessons of the U.S. venture capital
contracting model, provide guidance in constructing a rough template for government
efforts to engineer a venture capital market. The strategy reflects a central theme: the
government should address the simultaneity problem by providing seed capital and
helping to create the necessary financial intermediaries that together will encourage the
supply of entrepreneurs, while at the same time maintaining the pattern of intense
incentives coupled with intense monitoring that characterizes U.S. venture capital
contracting.
A. The Template
Extending both the Yozma insight and the Chilean CORFU program, the
government would issue a request for proposals for venture capital funds with the goal of
71
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selecting a number of funds run by competing professionals. The structure of these
funds, and the structure of the fund-portfolio company contract, would generally track the
U.S. pattern. A requirement of matching non-governmental investors, as reflected in the
CORFU program, provides interested monitors of the fund manager in the period prior to
the operation of an effective reputation market.
Under this arrangement, the fund managers would have the incentive to seek out
promising entrepreneurs, the experience to provide non-monetary assistance in the
development of the portfolio companies and, given the fixed term of the fund, the
obligation to exit the investment when their non-capital inputs were no longer necessary.
In turn, the government’s participation as a passive investor in the fund allows the
government to provide funds to the new market, but without itself participating in the
capital allocation process.
This requirement of allocative passivity is central to carving out an effective
governmental role in engineering a venture capital market. The most important flaw in
the WFG model was the German government’s creation of a financial intermediary with
essentially no incentives to succeed. Direct funding by the government, the most
common form of government assistance to creating an entrepreneurial sector, has the
potential to make things even worse through a kind of Gresham’s law. Like WFG, the
operators of direct government programs typically will lack the incentives to carefully
monitor portfolio company management and also will be subject to political pressure over
issues like management replacement and job maintenance. Additionally, those running
direct government programs are unlikely to have the experience and incentives to provide

approach toward encouraging a Chilean venture capital market similar to that reflected in the CORFU
program and in this paper.
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portfolio companies non-capital inputs (and efforts by the government, for example, to
influence the decisions of potential suppliers to the portfolio company would run the
obvious risk of political, as opposed to reputational, pressure).
To make matters worse, the flaws that arise from the government acting as the
financial intermediary may well be attractive to entrepreneurs, who often view the
monitoring and intervention of venture capitalists as unwanted intrusions. The best
entrepreneurs may then prefer the government program to private venture capital funds,
and more frequently fail because they will lack the benefits associated with an
experienced financial intermediary and a proper incentive and monitoring structure. This
leaves the less talented entrepreneurs to the private sector, who also will fail more
frequently, thereby discouraging development of private sector financial intermediaries
and decreasing the supply of entrepreneurs. In short, a misconceived government plan
can operate perversely to actually discourage the development of a private venture capital
market.
To be sure, even if the government invests in a private venture capital fund that
formally allocates the government a passive role, a realist would fear that the government
still might try to influence the selection of portfolio companies (and the interaction
between the venture capital fund and the portfolio company) informally through the
implicit promise of future government funding. Such an effort presents the fund manager
with a tradeoff. Fund managers whose initial efforts are successful will have the capacity
to attract private investors for future funds; in other words, the market makes an implicit
promise of future investment conditioned only on performance and without the risk of
opportunistic breach. In contrast, making politically influenced portfolio decisions
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reduces the likelihood of the fund’s success, thereby reducing the value of fund
manager’s carried interest. In turn, the reduced success of the fund makes it more
difficult for the fund manager to secure private investors for future funds.
The result, then, of acceding to the government’s effort at informal influence is to
substitute the government’s implicit promise of future funding for that of the market. A
fund manager would have reason to question the credibility of the government’s implicit
promise – implicit promises typically require the support of reputational sanction for
breach that is lacking in the government setting. Moreover, the reduced access to the
market for future funding as a result of reduced success due to government meddling
serves to render the fund manager’s human capital investment specific to its relation with
the government, thereby creating the potential for subsequent opportunistic conduct by
the government. To be sure, a government retains the means to pressure fund managers
if it loses sight of why it is engaged in the effort to engineer a venture capital market in
the first place, but that is true of any government involvement, and the proposed structure
both limits that effort to the informal, and creates important incentives for the fund
manager to resist.
This model of channeling government efforts to assist in creating a market into
passive investment through incentivized intermediaries has an interesting, if inadvertent,
precedent in the United States. Early in the development of the leveraged buyout
movements, state pension funds were among Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts earliest
investors.72 These early passive investments in KKR had the unintended consequence of
providing government support for the development of a private equity market, through an
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intensely incentivized financial intermediary, with precisely the results hoped for here:
successful performance by early KKR funds both attracted much more private investment
into the private equity market, led to the creation of many more funds, and generally
fueled the private equity market’s restructuring of U.S. industry.73
V. Qualifications and Conclusion
Any effort at financial engineering should close with qualifications. However
clever the blueprint, there will always be more moving parts than the engineers
contemplate. In the case of a government effort to engineer a venture capital market
through passive investment in a highly incentivized intermediary, the qualification
concerns the premise that derives from how I framed the simultaneity problem. The
supply of entrepreneurs was treated as solely a function of the availability of funds and
specialized intermediaries – if we build it, the entrepreneurs will come. But what about
an entrepreneurial culture as a precondition of a venture capital market? Why not a three
factor simultaneity model, instead of only two?
Two recent papers assessing the slow development of a German venture capital
market, even after funds and intermediaries were said to be available, argue that Germany
lacked the appropriate entrepreneurial culture, with those having the skills necessary to
form technology based start-ups lacking the tolerance for uncertainty critical to leaving
the nest of large firm employment. In this view, the final elements necessary to launch a
German early stage venture capital market was the internet explosion and a large number
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of Germans having been exposed to the United States business culture, especially through
business school training.74
To some extent the cultural criticism can be deflected. One characterization of
the criticism is that the success of venture capital-backed internet start-ups changed the
culture, thereby providing the final element necessary to engineering a venture capital
market. But this is simply rephrasing the simultaneity analysis I have offered, albeit with
an intermediate step the addition of: providing capital and incentivized financial
intermediaries attracts some entrepreneurs whose success, in turn, attracts still more
entrepreneurs. Stated more generally, a cultural change occurs between the government’s
engineering effort and the appearance of the market.
I readily confess to discomfort with too easy a recourse to culture as an
explanation for when a high technology venture capital market (or any other economic
institution) develops.75 Too many degrees of freedom are left with respect to the
direction of causation and with respect to defining the variables. Nonetheless, I can not
avoid a nagging doubt that my three-factor simultaneity model, like the two-factor asset
pricing model, may turn out to be analytically lovely but empirically challenged.76
Different countries may respond quite differently to the same engineering efforts. As
with the two-factor asset pricing model, other factors may explain the empirical results in
ways that turn out to be difficult to explain analytically even though their presence is
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revealed empirically. Should that prove true, the consolation will be that the engineering
effort still will have taught us something important by more clearly framing the
phenomenon that then needs explanation, but now with a range of experience in different
countries that will require more disciplined analysis than the cultural account has
provided to date.

cultural mores and economic institutions generally are consistent, thereby leaving the causative issue open.
The more interesting and unusual circumstance is when they differ.
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